FREEDOM IS ONE OF THE GREAT WORDS IN MAN'S VOCABULARY. BROADLY DEFINED, FREEDOM MEANS THE RIGHT OR POWER to choose and act according to our desires without compulsion or constraint. There are, however, different kinds of freedom. There is physical freedom. There is what may be called psychological freedom, the freedom to follow inclination or desire. These two may be called natural freedom; they belong to the lesser animals as well as man and imply no moral insight or power of contrary choice. A higher form of freedom is found in man's social life. We think first here of political freedom as represented by democracy, a freedom which is one of the late achievements of man, as yet won by only a small part of our race. With this has come the struggle for other forms of social freedom: freedom of conscience, of worship, of assemblage, of utterance of opinion and access to the truth. These all belong to the democratic way of life. In this sphere economic freedom is becoming increasingly important: not mere competitive freedom in which the weak go to the wall and the strong win the goods of life and control of others, but the freedom of a fair and equal opportunity to win a livelihood.

The peculiar Christian concern is with freedom in the moral-spiritual realm. Man has the power of contrary choice; he is able to halt action, reflect on varying goods and goals, and in the light of such reflection choose one rather than another course of conduct. That applies to the particular action but even more to the total course and end of his life. It is true that most of man's conduct moves unthinkingly along the line of habit and in accordance with the conventions of his own social group, but the power to make such choice is present. It is the assumption of high religion that he can do this. It is the task of religion to bring to him this privilege and obligation. It is God's challenge to man, that of Person to person: "Son of man, stand upon your feet" (Ezek. 2:1); "Come now, let us reason together" (Isa. 1:18); "Choose this day" (Josh. 24:15). We call this rational freedom because it demands reflection as to the meaning and end of conduct. We call it moral freedom because it involves a choice as to the goods or values to which we will give our allegiance.

Determinism

Determinism denies moral freedom. The theories of determinism vary according to the way in which the forces are conceived which are held to determine human behavior. They agree in asserting that in a given situation only one course of action is possible. In a mechanistic determinism the restraint or compulsion is that of outer forces. Metaphysical determinism conceives of an absolute control through some divine Power or through some fate which has fixed in advance the course of events. Psychological determinism is the most common form today of the denial of moral freedom. In a given situation the course of action, it holds, is determined by the strongest motive. The motive in turn is determined by what the man is in himself plus the action of his environment upon him. A reference to the factor of personal character seen as the result of previous choices does not alter the situation or save the idea of moral responsibility. For the first choice, equally with those which follow, is determined necessarily by the same factors of individual nature plus environment.

The consequences of the determinist position should be plainly noted.

1. There are its moral implications. Personal responsibility goes by the board. Sin is a tragic reality with tragic consequences, but from this standpoint the individual cannot rightly be blamed. His fate was fixed from the beginning by factors beyond his control-heredity and environment. Judas could not have acted differently any more than Paul or Peter. That means, of course, the repudiation of our deepest moral conviction; for this appears, not when a man says, "I did that, and it was wrong," but when he declares, "I did that, and I should and could have done otherwise."

2. We must face the implications for faith. No adequate theodicy is possible on this basis, for the ultimate responsibility for the human deed rests upon the creator God who made man and his environment. One can only appeal, with Calvin, to the inscrutable decrees of God. Nor can the dilemma be escaped by repudiating the position long enough to ascribe freedom to Adam before the fall. Thomas Hardy draws the terrible but logical consequence of this his own position in the closing words of his Tess of the D'Urber-villes, when Tess on the scaffold pays the penalty for the crime which was her deed but in no real sense her responsibility: "Justice was done, and the President of the Immortals had ended his sport with Tess."

3. Finally, with consistent determinism we sacrifice not only the ethical and the religious but the rational. Not only physical happenings and moral choices but rational processes would be strictly determined. If that is so, then there is no longer a reason which weighs and reflects and decides what is true. The category of the true disappears with that of the right. Then we have only opinions which, however much they may clash, are equally inevitable. The very argument for determinism is absurd if the determinist's ideas are all a predetermined result.

Fortunately, while some people do not live up to their announced principles, with others the practice rises above them. So the determinists in daily life and social practice reason with others, exhort to individual improvement and social reform, and assign praise and blame, assuming rationality, moral discernment, freedom of choice, and responsibility quite like the rest.

What is needed is a clearer understanding on both sides of where the issue lies, and first as to what this assertion of freedom does and does not involve.

What Freedom Involves

1. It does not mean an unconditional power enabling a man at any moment to choose one course or another with equal ease. We begin life with a given heredity. We live in a given environment, natural and social, which is constantly and powerfully working upon us. Previous choices have shaped our present character. There is no "freedom of the will" as a separate "faculty" in man or as a power working in independence of his world. We are dealing with the whole man and his whole world, with feelings and intelligence as well as will, with the heritage of the past and the total environment. We must think organically and not atomistically. Man's choosing is never unrelated or unmotivated.

2. The theory of moral freedom holds that these factors, however powerful, are not of themselves determinative. Neither the individual act nor a man's final fate is fixed for him, whether by divine decree, a mechanistic world order, or a combination of heredity and environment. Man is no mere passive resultant of forces; he is a free actor in this world. He does not always exercise his powers, but he can halt action, reflect on different courses open to him, and choose between them. Further, transcending the moment he can choose long-range goals and commit himself to certain ideals. Finally, and of supreme importance, he can ally himself with a world of higher spiritual forces in whose light he gains guidance for his long-range action, by whose help he is able to transcend these limiting conditions, especially the limits of his own weakness and his own wrong tendencies. Here is where the Christian doctrine of salvation comes in, not merely as forgiveness for past sins but as a way of help. But the help which thus comes to a man is not an impersonal force. It is God, coming to man with his truth and mercy and saving grace, speaking to man as person. And it is effective only with man's personal response, his understanding and free decision.

The real issue in the debate between determinism and moral freedom is that of the underlying world view, more particularly, as William James pointed out, the question as to what makes a rational world, or a world of order. ¹ The common presupposition of science, philosophy, and religion (except for a thoroughgoing agnosticism) is that this world is basically one of order or reason. Otherwise ordered thought or knowledge would be impossible. Determinists hold that this involves an order which is definite and fixed in every part, with no contingency, no "loose play of parts." Moral freedom for, them constitutes an irrational exception to this order.

But there is another conception of the rationality of the universe. It recognizes a double order. (1) There is an underlying "natural" order. It includes the spiritual world as well as the material. That which is behaves according to its nature and in dependable fashion. Things hang together; so do ideas. Hence we can have science, agriculture, industry, society. It is an order of cause and effect, of rational sequence which obtains in the moral world as well as the physical. (2) The second order is one that waits to be achieved. It works within the "natural" order but it transcends it as the workman transcends his tools and materials. It involves contingencies, higher possibilities, a certain free play. For the determinist everything is settled, is given in the now. The future simply brings to light what is already here. Time is meaningless. There is nothing creative in history, simply an unfolding. The play moves on to the end, but every scene, every action, is determined from the beginning. For those who hold to the idea of freedom this order is not an all-determining force or a prison wall; it is the necessary condition for free and effective action aiming at a higher order. The higher order is that of an achieved moral and spiritual life, of moral character won only through freedom, of a free fellowship of faith and love and righteousness. There is a God who is working out this higher order; the kingdom of God is his deed and gift. But he works on the level of freedom, not compulsion. The initial forms of this "freedom" appear in the element of contingency, recognized by science. It is seen more clearly with the coming of life. In man it appears as conscious, rational, moral freedom. He is the creature who can discern the goals of the creator God, the Father who "is working still" (John 5:17); and he can work with God in realizing them. Freedom is "the faculty of producing the new and of realizing meaning." ²

Of vital importance in this discussion is the distinction between "formal" and "real" freedom. Following an old usage, we mean by the former the moral freedom which we have been considering. We have seen that it is necessary for high achievement, moral and spiritual. Life on earth is life in the making, and it involves constant choice and constant conflict, conflict between ourselves and our world, between opposing ideals which invite our allegiance, between the two natures which we find within ourselves. Such conflict is the necessary road which we must take, but it is not the goal. That goal is harmony, unity, wholeness in all our relations and above all within ourselves. Facing such conflict, the power to choose is vital, "Life's business being just the terrible choice," in Browning's words. But the psalmist knew the goal, not as conflict but as victory: "Unite my heart to fear thy name" (Ps. 86:11). The choice, made with effort at first, but constantly repeated, becomes the fixed character. The enemy ceases to be a threat. There is mastery over one's world, over self. In this inner unity and growing power there is real freedom. Posse non peccare, magna est libertas, said Augustine. That is moral freedom, to be able not to sin. Non posse peccare, maxima est, he added. That is real liberty, not to be able to sin. True, so long as we live here on earth, we must sing, "O watch, and fight, and pray." Real freedom is a flying goal. But its increasing realization is a basic element in Christian salvation. "The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set me free from the law of sin and death." (Rom. 8:2. See also John 8:31-36; Rom. 7:8.) The foe of freedom, freedom of every form, is that which denies or hinders life and its free expression. The greatest foe is not external compulsion but inner division and limitation. The fullest freedom, "real freedom," comes only as we are whole within.

In this study of man and of moral freedom reference must be made to heredity and environment as important conditioning factors. Darwinian evolution sees man as the heir of long ages of biological development. Weismann's theory of the germ plasm and the Mendelian conception of inherited unit characters led many to conclude that what the individual is and what he may become are determined for him at birth. Anthropologist and sociologist have often laid a similar stress on environment, physical and social, as the determining factor in the development of the race and the individual.

Our doctrine of man and of salvation needs to give consideration to these factors. Body and spirit, heredity and environment, individual decision and achievement, all enter into the making of man. Thus Christian thought should be concerned with a sane eugenics, as also with social environment Individualistic religion of the pietistic or mystical type has often overlooked these, as has that theology which sees in religion only the vertical dimension, that of the soul and God. Biological heredity, cultural heritage, social and physical environment, these all enter into God's way of working for the making of man; man does not live and grow in vacua. God has created this order in which man's life is set, an order which brings not only problems for human life but needed conditions and means for its achievement.

But man is no mere resultant of heredity and environment. He has it in him to meet the problems which they bring and to use the opportunities which they furnish. As individual he may make choice of environment, as he does when he enters the fellowship of the Church. And he may alter the social environment by co-operative action through home and Church and state.

1) The Will to Believe and Other Essays, pp. 150-52.

2) Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History, p. 252. Cf. Emil Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 62: "God wills to be Lord; the Gloria Dei shall be reflected in men: this is the dominion, the Kingdom of God. He can be Lord in the perfect sense only when he finds the fullest devotion given to him by those who have the fullest freedom, that is to say, in love."